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Abstract 
A growing body of theoretical and empirical work identifies the ability of a country’s 
institutions to protect private property and provide incentives for investment as a key 
explanation for the persistent disparity in financial market development and economic 
performance across countries.  We add to this literature by analyzing the impact of 
institutions on financial development using data on the financial decisions of immigrants 
and the native-born in the U.S. While all of the individuals whose decisions we analyze 
face the same formal institutional framework in the U.S., immigrants bring with them 
their experiences with institutions in their home countries.  Our findings indicate that 
overall, immigrants are less likely than the native-born to participate in U.S. financial 
markets.  This finding is robust to including controls for income, age, education, marital 
status, and time spent in the U.S.  We also find that immigrants who come from countries 
with institutions that are more effective at protecting property rights are more likely to 
participate in U.S. financial markets.  In fact, variation in institutional quality in 
immigrant source countries fully explains the low financial market participation of 
immigrants relative to the native-born. Having controlled for institutional quality in the 
home country, the fact that an individual is an immigrant has no additional power to 
explain financial market participation.  These findings are generally robust to alternative 
measures of institutional effectiveness and to various methods of controlling for 
unobserved individual characteristics. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A central goal of economics is to understand why some economies perform better than 
others.  A growing body of theoretical and empirical work identifies the ability of a 
country’s institutions to protect private property and provide incentives for investment as 
one of the key explanations for the persistent disparity in financial market development 
and economic performance across countries.
2   This paper uses a new approach to test the 
hypothesis that better institutions will lead to greater financial development and provides 
independent evidence that the effectiveness of institutions for protecting private property 
is a key determinant of financial market development.   
 
Our approach takes advantage of the fact that in any given year, vast numbers of 
individuals confront new institutional surroundings and, in some fortuitous cases, detailed 
data are collected on the financial decisions they make in their new institutional 
environments. For example, more than 200 million people migrate from developing to 
developed economies in any given year (Harris 2002) and in the process move from one 
institutional environment to another. Together with their skill and talents, international 
migrants bring attitudes and experiences acquired in their country of origin to the 
destination country.  In particular, to use Douglass North’s terminology, immigrants may 
embody the informal institutional constraints reflected in their home country customs, 
traditions and codes of conduct.
3   
 
The goal of this paper is to examine whether individual behavior is influenced by 
informal institutional constraints that are literally embodied in individuals.  We consider 
the situation when the institutional environment changes, because individuals and 
families move from one institutional environment to another.  Although the host country 
institutional environment may be profoundly different, the informal institutional 
constraints embodied in recent migrants may continue to shape their behavior. 
International migration allows us to study the impact of placing an individual into a 
different institutional environment while holding past experience with institutions fixed. 
 
We analyze the impact of institutions on financial development using data on the 
financial decisions of immigrants and the native-born in the U.S. While all of the 
individuals whose decisions we analyze face a common institutional framework in the 
U.S., they bring with them their experiences with institutions in their home country.  By 
analyzing how financial decisions in the U.S. are influenced by the quality of home 
country institutions, we gain insights into how the institutional framework becomes 
embedded in individuals and how susceptible it is to change.  For example, we can 
compare the importance of home country institutions for recent migrants relative to 
migrants who have been in the U.S. for many years.  This comparison provides some 
insight into the potential pace of economic progress and financial development following 
institutional reform.  
 
                                                 
2 See for example, North (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995), La Porta et al. (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2002) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002).  
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The data we analyze come from the 1996 – 2000 panel of the Survey on Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), which we have merged with country-level data on 
institutional, legal, financial and socio-economic characteristics for immigrants’ origin 
countries.  Our findings indicate that overall, immigrants are less likely than the native-
born to participate in U.S. financial markets.  They are less likely to own savings 
accounts and less likely to own stock.  This finding is robust to including controls for 
income, age, education, marital status, and time spent in the U.S.   
 
Our findings indicate that institutional quality matters and it matters a lot.  We show that 
immigrants who come from countries with institutions that are more effective at 
protecting property rights are more likely to participate in U.S. financial markets. In fact, 
the lower financial-market participation of immigrants relative to the native-born appears 
to be fully explained by variation in institutional quality in the immigrant source 
countries. Once we control for institutional quality in the home country, the fact that an 
individual is an immigrant has no additional power to explain financial market 
participation.  These findings are robust to alternative measures of institutional 
effectiveness and to various methods of controlling for unobserved migrant 
characteristics. 
 
The approach we take to investigate the importance of institutional quality for financial 
development allows us to glean rudimentary insight into the relative importance of what 
Douglass North terms “formal constraints -- rules that human beings devise” and 
“informal constraints – such as conventions and rules of behavior”.
4  The bulk of the 
evidence to date on the importance of institutions for institutional quality comes from 
cross-country studies.  These studies reveal the total impact of institutions: formal and 
informal.  We use individual data and all of the individuals whose behavior we analyze 
face the same set of formal rules in the U.S., therefore our approach isolates the impact of 
informal institutional constraints that are embodied in individuals.   
 
Understanding the role of informal institutional constraints is a crucial component of 
predicting the impact of formal institutional change and of making appropriate policy 
recommendations.  It is relatively straight-forward to change formal institutions by 
altering the written rules of that govern society, but changing the informal institutional 
constraints that manifest themselves in culture and norms of behavior is much more 
challenging.  For example, Murell (1996), citing North (1990), describes policies in the 
countries that made up the former Soviet Union as a “mélange of the old and the new, a 
pattern typical of times of great institutional change, when revolutions in formal rules 
move far ahead of modifications in informal arrangement and behavior.”  By comparing 
our findings, which isolate the impact of informal institutional constraints, with those 
from cross-country investigations, which capture the total impact of institutions, we can 
approximate the percentage of the total impact that comes from informal rather than 
formal constraints.   
 
The next section reviews the literature on institutional quality and describes the 
framework we use to derive the predicted relationship between institutional quality and 
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financial market decisions.  In section 3, we describe the country and individual level 
data that we analyze.  Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, discusses our findings and 
their robustness.  Section 5 presents conclusions. 
 
2.  Background and Framework 
 
The view that better institutions lead to greater financial development and better 
economic performance is powerfully captured by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations: 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which people do not feel 
themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of 
contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not 
supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payments of debts from all 
those who are able to pay.  Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom 
flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the 
justice of government. 
This view receives support from a number of recent empirical studies, including those by 
Knack and Keeffer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001 and 2002), and La Porta et al. (1998).  In addition, Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2002) present evidence that, not only do high quality institutions contribute to 
economic development, institutions are, in fact, the key determinant of economic 
development.  In particular, once institutions are accounted for, the role of geography and 
trade in promoting economic development are negligible. 
 
The fundamental identification issue that these authors confront is that current 
institutional quality is likely to be endogenous, because rich countries can afford good 
institutions, for example.  The literature to date uses cross-country data on economic and 
financial development together with measures of institutional quality and focuses on 
overcoming the identification issue by finding an exogenous source of variation in 
institutional quality.  Examples of exogenous determinants of institutional quality 
include: distance from the equator (Hall and Jones, 1999), settler mortality (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002), population 
density in 1500 (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002), and legal origin (La Porta et 
al., 1998).  Having identified an appropriate instrument, these papers regress country 
level measures of economic or financial performance on institutional quality, 
appropriately instrumented, and find a causal relationship between better institutions and 
greater financial development and better economic outcomes. 
 
Our paper uses an alternative empirical approach to test the hypothesis that institutions 
are important for financial market development.  Our approach complements the existing 
literature and also offers some additional insights into how the quality of institutions 
effects economic decisions.  We address the endogeneity issue by examining individual 
level data.  We can safely assume that individuals, unlike countries, take the institutional 
environment as given when they make economic decisions.  Of course, it is possible that  
the institutional environment influences the decision to migrate, if particular types of 
individuals from countries with weak institutions are more likely to migrate for example.    5
If this is the case, then, in the context of international migration, the institutional 
environment of the country of origin can not be taken as given.  This is of particular 
concern if the individual characteristics that influence the migration decision are 
unobservable.  We use a variety of empirical techniques to deal with this possibility and 
to distinguish the impact of the home country institutional environment on the migration 
decision from the impact of these institutions on financial market participation in the U.S.  
While the second source effect of institutions is the focus of this paper, the impact of the 
institutional environment on migration decision is interesting in its own right, as well. 
 
The challenge in using individual data is to find meaningful variation in institutional 
quality within a single data set.  We achieve this by looking at a large sample of 
individuals living in the U.S.  Historically high rates of migration to the U.S. in the past 
two decades mean that at least 10 percent of the U.S. population was born abroad.  The 
1996 – 2000 Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data that we use are 
designed to be representative of the U.S. population and include approximately 46,000 
individuals, of whom 10% are immigrants.
5  These individuals face a common set of 
formal institutional constraints in the U.S., but the immigrants vary in the institutional 
constraints that they have experienced prior to coming to the U.S. 
 
By analyzing the impact of country of origin institutional quality on individual financial 
decisions, we can test whether informal institutional constraints embodied in individuals 
are important.  If they are, then we should see lower financial market participation in 
migrants who come from countries with weak institutions, compared to migrants who 
come from countries with stronger institutions.  If institutions work primarily through 
formal constraints, then the quality of country of origin institutions should be 
unimportant in explaining financial market participation rates.  To the extent that 
informal institutional constraints are important determinants of financial market 
participation, we can also explore how persistent these effects are.  Are they inherited and 
present even in individuals who migrate as young children, for example?  Do they decay 
with time and experience in the U.S.? 
 
It is helpful to sketch out a very simple reduced form framework in order to make the 
hypotheses that we test clear.  While we illustrate the framework in terms of an 
individual’s decision about how much stock to purchase, it could easily apply to other 
financial decisions as well.  Consider an individual, i, from country J who is considering 
how much stock to purchase.  The individual’s demand for stock is represented by: 
) , ( i i X ER f S =  
where Si is the amount of money that individual i invests in stock, ER is the expected 
return from the investment, and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (risk aversion, 
wealth, education, years in the U.S., age at migration, and so on) that affect the demand 
for stock.   
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Institutional quality is modeled by assuming that the investor believes there is some 
probability, πi that the stock broker will abscond with the investor’s funds. We assume 
that brokers are governed by the same institutional framework and therefore they face a 
common cost of absconding.  This means that broker variation in the likelihood of 
absconding can be safely ignored. 
 
Given her beliefs, the investor’s expected return on the investment will not be R, the 
expected return on the stock, but πi x 0 + (1 – πi) x R.  The probability that an investor 
places on the likelihood that the stock broker absconds is a function of the quality of the 
institutions in the country that investor was born in, J, which may in turn be a function of  
the length of time the investor experienced those institutions, yJ, and the length exposure 
that the investor has to U.S. institutions, yUS: πi = π(J, yJ, yUS).
 6  
 
For the typical immigrant who comes from a country where institutions are weaker than 
in the U.S., π is decreasing in origin country institutional quality, increasing in years 
spent in the origin country, and decreasing in years spent in the U.S.
7  Given this 
framework, demand for stock will be increasing in home country institutional quality and 
for a given level of institutional quality, π will be higher for individuals who have 
recently arrived in the U.S. and who have arrived as adults. 
 
3.  Data 
 
Country data 
 
The country data that we use are described in Tables 1, 2 and 3A and B.  Table 1 defines 
each variable and describes its source.  Our preferred measure of institutional quality is 
“protection from expropriation”.   This variable measures the extent to which individual 
property rights are protected and captures a key component of the institutional framework 
that is important for financial market participation: the extent to which individuals can be 
sure that they will realize the return on their investments.  Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) also use this variable along with another variable that captures restraints 
on government power.  In our baseline estimates, we average annual measures of the 
protection from expropriation index from 1982 to 1995 from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS – 3 data.  These data were constructed by Stephen Knack and 
the IRIS Center, University of Maryland from monthly data provided by Political Risk 
Services.   
 
Table 3A presents some summary statistics for each of the country-level variables that we 
use.  In the data, protection from expropriation ranges from 1.83 (Iraq) to 10.00 (the U.S., 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Switzerland).  The average value is 7.06 and the median 
country’s protection from expropriation measure is 7.07.  Some of the important 
                                                 
6 In general, the expected rate of return on stock would be determined in equilibrium outcome, taking into 
account the broker’s utility of absconding as well as investors’ perceptions of that likelihood and the 
distribution of individuals with varying beliefs in the economy. 
7 Note that the U.S. measure of protection from expropriation, our preferred measure of institutional quality 
is ten, which is the maximum possible value.   7
immigrant countries of origin have above average values for protection from 
expropriation: Mexico (7.51), China (7.79), and Canada (9.79).   
 
We also use three other measures of institutional quality from the ICRG-IRIS – 3 data, 
quality of the bureaucracy, rule of law and ethnic tensions.  The variables we use in the 
estimates are again averages of the annual measures from 1982 to 1995.  In addition to 
these measures of institutional quality, we also examine the effects of other exogenous 
determinants of institutional quality: years of independence (from the CIA Factbook), 
whether the country has English as an official language (from the CIA Factbook), 
whether the country’s legal tradition is British (from La Porta et al., 1999), a measure of 
how far the country is from the equator, the absolute value of the latitude of the capital 
divided by 90 (also from La Porta et al., 1999).  In addition to these proxies for 
institutional quality, important country-level control variables include income, as 
measured by the log of average real per capita gdp from 1970 to 1995 from La Porta et al 
(1999), and inequality, measured by the average of all high quality gini coefficient 
observations from 1980 to 1995 from Deininger and Squire (1996).   
 
Table 3B reports on the correlations between the country level variables.  As one might 
expect, many of the measures of institutional quality are highly positively correlated 
across countries.  This table also documents the high degree of correlation between 
income and institutional quality as well as the negative correlation between inequality 
and income and between inequality and institutional quality. 
 
 
Individual data 
 
We rely on the SIPP data for individual characteristics and measures of financial market 
participation.  The 1996 – 2000 SIPP Panel includes 12 waves of data on approximately 
46,000 individuals over the age of 18.  The SIPP data are representative of the U.S. 
population as a whole, and nearly 11% of the original sample are immigrants and 
approximately one-third of the immigrants arrived in the U.S. within the past 10 years. 
Just over half of the immigrants were born in a Latin American country and about 18% 
were born in a European country.  We restrict our attention to a sample made up of all of 
the immigrants and a randomly chosen sample of an equal number of natives, for a total 
sample of 9,284 individuals, and 111,401 observations, with 12 observations per person.  
Table 2 summarizes these data for the whole sample, the native-born and immigrants.  
 
Compared to the native-born, immigrants are younger, more likely to be married, non-
white, have more children and more likely to be unemployed our economically inactive.  
Immigrants also tend to be less educated than the native born.  Nearly 36% of the 
immigrant sample has never completed high school compared to only 17% of the native-
born sample.  However, the percentage of immigrants and the native-born who have an 
advanced degree is roughly the same at 7%.  Monthly per capita household income is 
significantly lower for immigrants compared to the native-born.  For immigrants, average 
monthly per capita household income is $1,275, compared to $1,684 for the native-born. 
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Measures of financial market participation 
 
The empirical work focuses on two measures of financial market participation.
8  The first 
measure that we consider is stock market participation.  Investing in the stock market 
requires a great deal of institutional support.  The investor must be relatively well 
convinced that the stock broker will not abscond with her money and that the institutional 
and legal framework is sufficient to ensure that her money will be invested in profitable 
projects and that the proceeds of these projects will be returned to investors and not be 
expropriated by management either in the form of non-productive investment or through 
outright theft.  In each wave of data collection, at roughly 4 month intervals, individuals 
are asked whether they own any stock.  In the data, 9.3% of the immigrant sample owns 
stock, compared with 18.5% of the native-born sample.   
 
The second measure that we consider is savings account ownership.  The decision to put 
money in a savings account requires less institutional support relative to investing in the 
stock market.  In this case, the investor must only be convinced only that the bank will 
keep her funds safe, accurately pay any interest that is due to her, and return the 
accumulated funds upon demand.  Individuals are asked about savings account ownership 
every 4 months, as well.  In the data, 42% of the immigrant sample has a savings account, 
compared with 54.5% of the native-born sample. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Strategy and Findings 
 
This section reports on our empirical findings.  We estimate the decision to participate in 
financial markets using a linear probability model.  For each set of estimates we consider 
two measures of financial market participation: the decision to invest in the stock market 
and the decision to open a savings account.  All of the reported standard errors have been 
corrected to account for the heteroscedasticity that is implicit in the linear probability 
model.  The reported standard errors are also adjusted to allow for correlation across 
observations for a given individual.  
 
Baseline Findings 
 
Tables 4A and B report our baseline findings for stock market participation and savings 
account ownership, respectively.  Each of the estimates include age, age squared, labor 
force status, income, income squared, marital status, the number of children in the 
household, sex, race, and education as explanatory variables.  In addition to these 
variables, each estimate also includes controls for the Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) where an individual resides.  The omitted category is “lives outside of an MSA”.  
Among other things, the MSA controls account for the possibility that access to financial 
markets varies across major metropolitan areas within the U.S. The sample includes 
individuals age eighteen and over.   
 
                                                 
8 Although the SIPP data include, in principle, information on portfolio allocations, measures of financial 
market participation have far fewer missing values and are measured with less error.   9
Looking first at the estimates of stock market participation in column [1] of Table 4A, we 
find that individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market as they get older.  
Being unemployed or out of the labor force has a significantly positive effect on the 
likelihood of stock market participation.  Both of these effects are likely to be the result 
of retired individuals who are receiving income from their stock investments.  Income has 
a strong positive effect on stock market participation.  If monthly per capita household 
income were to increase by one standard deviation from its mean, by $1,566, the 
likelihood of stock market participation would increase by 10.5 percentage points, a 75% 
increase relative to the observed likelihood of stock market participation of 14%. 
 
Men and women are equally likely to participate in the stock market according to our 
estimates.  Married individuals are much more likely to invest in the stock market; being 
married increases the likelihood of stock market participation by nearly 7 percentage 
points.  The presence of children in the household also increases the likelihood of owning 
stock, with each additional child raising the probability of owning stock by 1 percentage 
point.  Non-white individuals are significantly less likely to own stock.  Black, Hispanic 
or Asian individuals are 4.1 percentage points less likely to own stock.  Stock market 
participation increases sharply with education.  Relative to individuals with less than a 
high school diploma, high school graduates are 4.8 percentage points more likely to own 
stock, those who have attended college are 10 percentage points more likely to own 
stock, college graduates are 16 percentage points more likely to own stock and 
individuals with an advanced degree are 21 percentage points more likely to own stock. 
 
There are some interesting differences between the determinants of savings account 
ownership and stock ownership; although overall the findings are fairly similar.  The 
baseline estimates for savings account ownership are reported in column [1] of Table 4B.  
In contrast to the findings for stock market ownership, being unemployed or out of the 
labor force has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of having a savings account.  
These individuals are 11 percentage points less likely to have a savings account.  As was 
the case for stock ownership, income has a large positive effect on the likelihood of 
having a savings account.  A one standard deviation increase in monthly per capita 
household income would lead to a 9.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
having a savings account, a 20% increase relative to the observed percentage of the 
individuals in the sample who have a savings account of 48%. 
 
As was the case for stock market participation, men and women appear equally likely to 
have a savings account.  Being married has a strong positive impact on the likelihood of 
having a savings account just as it did for stock ownership.  Married individuals are 17 
percentage points more likely to have a savings account compared to their single 
counterparts.  In contrast to the findings for stock ownership, the presence of children in 
the household lowers the likelihood of having a savings account somewhat. The 
likelihood decreases by 0.6 percentage points with the presence of each additional child.  
As was the case with the stock market results, non-white individuals are significantly less 
likely to have a savings account.  Black, Hispanic or Asian individuals are 3.8 percentage 
points less likely to have a savings account.   
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Like stock market participation, savings account ownership increases with education.   
For example, individuals with a high school diploma are 9.7 percentage points more 
likely to have a savings account compared to individuals with less schooling.  Individuals 
who have attended college are 18 percentage points more likely to have a savings account 
compared to individuals with less than a high school education.  Additional schooling 
does not lead to additional increases in the likelihood of having a savings account, 
however.  This contrasts somewhat with the findings for stock market participation, 
where the likelihood of participation increased with additional higher education. 
 
Turning now to one of the important issues in our study, we find that immigrants are 
much less likely to participate in the stock market and much less likely to have a savings 
account compared to the native-born.  All else equal, immigrants are 4.6 percentage 
points less likely to own stock or have a savings account compared to the native-born.  
There are a number of potential explanations for this finding: immigrants may face 
discrimination based on country or region of origin that inhibits financial market 
participation, immigrants may tend to live in neighborhoods within MSAs where fewer 
financial services are available, immigrants may learn about financial services from other 
immigrants, which would tend to reinforce low financial market participation over time 
among immigrants (see Hong, Kubik and Stein (2001), for example).  In addition, legal 
status and the ability to speak English may also play an important role in financial market 
decisions, and immigrants may rely more on informal financial institutions, compared to 
the native born.   
 
We hypothesize that the explanation for lower immigrant participation financial markets 
lies with the institutional framework that immigrants have experienced in their countries 
of origin.  The rest of this section is concerned with demonstrating that measures of home 
country institutional effectiveness can explain the lower financial market participation of 
immigrants.   
 
In column [2] of Tables 4A and B, we add “protection from expropriation” in the country 
of origin to the set explanatory variables described above. As discussed above, 
“protection from expropriation” captures the extent to which the institutional framework 
in the country of origin protects private property and creates a positive climate for 
investment.  For the native-born, this variable is equal to the value for the U.S., which is 
the maximum possible value, 10.  When we add “protection from expropriation” to the 
stock market participation and the savings account ownership estimates, we find that the 
immigrant indicator is no longer significantly different from zero.  In a statistical sense, 
the “protection from expropriation” variable fully explains the lower financial market 
participation rates of immigrants. The magnitude and the significance of the other 
explanatory variables remain very close to their previous values, with one exception.  The 
negative effect of being non-white falls from -0.041 to -0.033, for stock and from -0.038 
to -0.031 for savings. 
 
The coefficient on “protection from expropriation” is positive and strongly significant.  
Individuals, who were born in countries with strong institutions, as captured by this 
variable, are more likely to participate in financial markets in the U.S. compared to   11
individuals who migrated from countries with weaker institutions.  According to these 
estimates, if an individual from a country with “average” institutions had instead come 
from a country that had institutions that were one standard deviation above the mean, the 
likelihood that they owned stock would increase by 3.9 percentage points, a 41.5% 
increase in the likelihood of stock market participation, relative to the observed 
participation rate for immigrants of 9.3%.  Or to put it a perhaps more relevant way, if 
institutions in El Salvador had achieved the same quality as Mexico’s between 1982 and 
1995, then we would expect the stock market participation of Salvadorans in the U.S. to 
be 5.25 percentage points higher and the ownership of savings accounts to be 4.75 
percentage points higher.   
 
Additional Country Controls 
 
We turn our attention now to exploring the robustness of our findings and determining 
whether it is appropriate to interpret them causally.  The first issue we consider is that 
there may be other important country of origin characteristics that are correlated with 
institutional quality that were left out of the baseline results.  For example, perhaps it is 
not institutional quality that matters, but income in the country of origin.  We may have 
found a significantly positive effect of institutional quality on financial market 
participation because institutional quality is positively correlated with country income 
and country income was not included in the baseline estimates.  We explore the 
possibility that our findings are the result of omitted country characteristics in Table 5.  
We report on five estimates for stock market participation (in panel A of the Table) and 
for savings account ownership (in panel B of the Table).  Although the coefficient 
estimates are not reported in the Table, each of these estimates includes all of the same 
control variables that were included in the baseline estimates.  
 
The first column of Table 5 repeats the results from Table 4A column [2], for stock, and 
from Table 4B column [2] for savings.  Since countries with high institutional quality 
also tend to have been colonized by Britain, it is possible that the positive coefficient on 
protection from expropriation is capturing not institutional quality, but the ability of 
individuals who were born in some former British colonies to speak English.  To control 
for this, the second estimate in Table 5 adds an indicator variable that is equal to one if 
the country of origin has English as an official language of the country.  One potential 
explanation for the low financial market participation of immigrants is that the ability or 
inability to speak English plays an important role in determining the cost of financial 
market participation.  Ideally, we would include an individual measure of English 
speaking ability in the estimates.  However, the SIPP data does not include any measure 
of this characteristic, so we try to capture it at the country level instead.  Coming from a 
country where English is an official language has a significant and positive effect on the 
likelihood of having a savings account.  It has no effect on the likelihood of owning 
stock.  When this variable is included in the estimates, the coefficient on “protection from 
expropriation” remains positive and highly significant for both stock market participation 
and savings account ownership.   
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Another potential explanation for our findings is that financial market adaptation is easier 
for immigrants from countries that are more similar to the U.S.  This would mean that the 
positive coefficient on protection from expropriation should be interpreted to mean that 
individuals from countries with institutions like the U.S. are more likely to participate in 
U.S. financial markets, rather than as an indication that better institutions to protect 
private property encourage financial market participation.  If this is the case, then 
including other, potentially better, measures of the similarity between the country of 
origin economy and the U.S. should eliminate the significance of protection from 
expropriation.  In order to capture this possibility, we include the log of gdp per capita in 
the country of origin in the estimate presented in column [3] of Table 5.  The impact of 
this variable is not significantly different from zero and, when it is included, the 
coefficient on protection from expropriation remains highly significant and the point 
estimate is essentially unchanged at 0.022 for stock and 0.016 for savings.    
 
In column [4] of Table 5, we report on estimates that include both an indicator that is 
equal to one if English is an official language of the individual’s country of origin and the 
log of gdp per capita for that country.  Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1987) both show that 
immigrants from English speaking countries experience more rapid wage assimilation.  
About 28% of the countries in our sample have English as an official language. These 
estimates produce somewhat different results for stock and savings.  For participation in 
the stock market, the results are unchanged relative to the baseline findings: protection 
from expropriation is positive and significant and the effect of the other two variables 
cannot be distinguished from zero.  For savings account ownership the results are 
qualitatively the same, however the coefficient on protection from expropriation falls in 
both magnitude and significance.  The coefficient on protection from expropriation falls 
from 0.019 to 0.011 and is positive with only 7% significance.  The difference in the 
robustness of the findings for stock ownership relative to savings account ownership is 
consistent with the level of institutional support required for each financial arrangement, 
as discussed above. 
 
In column [5] of Table 5, we report on estimates that include continent controls in 
addition to protection from expropriation.  One possible explanation for our findings is 
that there is discrimination against individuals based on their continent of origin, say 
Africa or Central or South America, for example, and that countries in the same continent 
tend to share institutional qualities.
9  This might mean that the protection from 
expropriation risk variable is measuring the effect of discrimination rather than 
institutional quality.  In order to explore the feasibility of this potential explanation, we 
add a set of continent controls to the estimates.  We can not rule out this potential 
explanation for the savings results.  When we include continent controls in the estimates 
of savings account ownership, the coefficient on protection from expropriation becomes 
indistinguishable from zero.  For stock ownership, however, the coefficient on protection 
from expropriation remains positive and significant at 0.015, with a standard error or 
0.004, even when continent controls are included. 
 
                                                 
9 Recall that the estimates include a control for being “non-white”, so the continent controls capture 
differential treatment based on continent of origin, holding racial characteristics fixed.   13
Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality 
 
In Tables 6A and 6B we report on estimates for stock market participation and savings 
account ownership, respectively, that use alternative measures of country of origin 
institutional quality.  The alternative measures that we consider are: bureaucratic quality, 
rule of law, ethnic tensions, whether the country’s legal origin is British, the absolute 
value of the latitude of the country’s capital divided by 90, and the number of years that 
the country has been independent since 1776. These estimates are found in the order 
mentioned in columns [2] - [7] of Tables 6A and B.   
 
For both stock market participation and savings account ownership, we find that the 
results are unchanged when we substitute bureaucratic quality or the rule of law for 
protection from expropriation.  In these cases, the coefficient on the institutional quality 
variable is highly significant with a point estimate of approximately 0.02 and the 
coefficient on the immigrant indicator variable is indistinguishable from zero.   
 
Some studies find that the degree of ethnic tensions in a country is an important predictor 
of institutional quality, since the greater ethnic diversity may lead to the adoption of 
policies that favor expropriation of resources, rather than the emergence of open and 
competitive systems (Easterly and Levine, 2002).  This variable has no significant effect 
on the likelihood of stock market participation or savings account ownership.  When it is 
substituted for protection from expropriation, the coefficient on immigrant status 
becomes significantly negative.  In these estimates we find that immigrants are 6.5 
percentage points less likely to own stock or have a savings account. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998 and 2000) show that greater protection is offered to shareholders in 
countries with a British legal tradition.  Financial development is also accelerated in these 
countries.  Approximately 30% of the countries in our sample have a British legal 
tradition.  Our findings reinforce that view.  Individuals from countries with a British 
legal tradition are 3.5 percentage points more likely to own stock and 6.7 percentage 
points more likely to have a savings account in the U.S.  The effect of immigrant status is 
insignificant in the savings estimates that include British legal origin.  However, in the 
stock market estimates, we find that British legal origin is not sufficient to “explain” the 
immigrant variable.  Although the immigrant variable is smaller and less significant 
compared to the baseline estimates with no controls for institutional quality, immigrants 
are still 2.4 percentage points less likely to own stock compared with native-born 
individuals.  
 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
find that geography has an important effect on the quality of institutions.  Countries that 
are further from the equator tend to develop stronger institutions.  Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001) argue that European colonialists adopted different colonization 
policies, with different associated institutions in different areas.  Although their work 
emphasize the role of settler mortality rates in determining the colonization policy, they 
also show that places where effective institutional arrangements were established tend to 
be further from the equator.   In addition, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2002) show   14
that latitude helps to explain financial development.  We include the absolute value of the 
latitude of the capital city divided by 90 to capture this effect and find that individuals 
who were born in countries that are further from the equator are significantly more likely 
to participate in the U.S. stock market.  While the coefficient estimate on latitude is 
positive in the savings account ownership regression, it is not significant.  However, in 
neither case, does this geographic control “explain” the lower financial market 
participation of immigrants.  This is largely consistent with both Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) who both find that while 
geography is an important determinant of institutions, it is not an important determinant 
of economic outcomes, once institutions are controlled for.  
 
Institutional quality may be higher in countries that have experienced more years of 
independence in which to develop effective institutions.  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2002) find that additional years of independence are associated with greater 
measures of financial market development.  Our findings are mixed.  We find that 
individuals who were born in countries that have been independent longer are 
significantly more likely to have a savings account but this variable has no significant 
effect on stock market participation.  In both cases, the immigrant indicator variable 
remains negative and significant. 
 
The estimates in Tables 6A and 6B do not suggest that the finding that country of origin 
institutional quality as proxied by “protection from expropriation” explains the lower 
financial market participation of migrants are driven by how we measure institutional 
quality.   
 
Unobserved Individual Characteristics 
 
If unobserved individual characteristics are correlated with country of origin institutional 
quality, then we need to be concerned that our findings capture the effect of unobserved 
individual characteristics, rather than the effect of institutional quality on financial market 
participation.  We consider two methods of controlling for this possibility.   
 
According to Borjas (1987), the decision to migrate will be a function of, among other 
things, unobserved migrant ability and the distribution of income in the country of origin 
and the destination country.  Because they are only concerned with the right tail of the 
income distribution, high ability migrants will tend to migrate from more equal societies 
to less equal ones.   In contrast, low ability migrants will move from less equal societies 
to more equal ones, to protect themselves against a draw from the low end of the wage 
distribution.  Since countries with low inequality also tend to have strong institutions, we 
have to be concerned that our finding that financial market participation increases with 
country of origin institutional quality is driven by the high ability individuals migrating 
from countries with low inequality and high quality institutions.  We address this by 
adding a measure of country of origin inequality, the gini coefficient, to the baseline 
estimates.   
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These results are found in Table 7.  Because gini coefficient data are only available for a 
subset of countries, these estimates use a smaller sample.  The first column in Table 7 
reports the baseline findings for the smaller sample.  The second column adds the country 
of origin gini coefficient and the third column adds the log of gdp per capita in the 
country of origin as well.  We can not rule out the possibility that selective immigration 
of the sort described above is influencing the results for savings account ownership.   
Individuals from countries with greater inequality are less likely to have a savings 
account and when inequality is controlled for, the institutional quality variable is no 
longer significant.  In contrast, the stock market participation findings appear to be robust 
to this type of selection.  We find that individuals from countries with more inequality are 
less likely to own stock, and the coefficient on institutional quality remains positive and 
highly significant.  The point estimate ranges from 0.017, when just the gini coefficient is 
included, to 0.020, when the gini coefficient and log per capita gdp are included, 
compared to the baseline estimate of 0.025 for this sample.   
 
In addition to unobserved ability, there are other individual characteristics that we cannot 
observe that may have an important role in the decision to participate in financial markets 
and may also be correlated with country of origin institutional quality.  For example, 
undocumented immigrants may be less likely to participate in U.S. financial markets and 
it may be the case that immigrants from countries with weaker institutions are more likely 
to be undocumented.  Another important omitted variable is past participation in financial 
institutions.  Immigrants from countries with stronger institutions may be more likely to 
have participated in financial markets in their country of origin, since those markets were 
likely to be better developed.  If this behavior translates to the U.S., then the coefficient 
on institutional quality may not be capturing the effect of institutions so much as the 
effect of past behavior (albeit influenced by institutions).  The likelihood of return 
migration may also influence savings and investment behavior directly (see Paulson and 
Singer, 2001) and be correlated with institutional quality.  Similarly, we cannot measure 
the effect of discrimination based on country of origin or region of origin controls, or 
variation in access to financial markets within an MSA.   
 
In order to produce accurate estimates of the effect of country of origin institutional 
quality on financial market participation in the U.S., we need to eliminate the possibility 
that omitted individual characteristics are correlated with country of origin institutional 
quality.  If we can do this, we can confidently interpret the coefficient estimate on 
institutional quality, despite the fact that there may be important individual characteristics 
that we do not observe.   
 
To do this, we take advantage of the fact that for a given country of origin, there is 
variation in when migrants arrive in the U.S. and variation in institutional quality over the 
time period that our data cover.
10  We create three institutional quality variables:  the first 
averages annual values from 1980 to 1984, the second from 1985 to 1989 and the third 
from 1990 to 1995.  Migrants are assigned the institutional quality measure that captures 
the conditions in the country of origin at the time they left.  Since we now have a measure 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, the SIPP data tell us the five year interval during which a migrant came to the U.S. to 
stay.  The publicly available data do not tell us the precise year when migrants arrive.   16
of institutional quality that varies for a given country, we can estimate the relationship 
between financial market participation and institutional quality controlling for country 
fixed effects.  In this specification, we eliminate the possibility that the coefficient on 
institutional quality is biased due to omitted time-invariant individual characteristics that 
are correlated with country of origin.  These estimates are reported in Table 8. While the 
estimates presented in Table 8 eliminate the possibility the effect of institutional quality 
is biased due to omitted individual characteristics that are fixed through time, it is still 
conceivable that some of the effect is due to time varying individual characteristics that 
are correlated with changes in institutional quality.   
 
The dependent variable in the first column of Table 8 is equal to one if an individual 
owns stock in the interview period and is equal to zero otherwise.  The dependent 
variable in the second column of Table 8 is equal to one if an individual had a savings 
account in the interview period and is zero otherwise.  These estimates include the same 
controls as those in column [2] of Table 4A (for stock market participation) and Table 4B 
(for savings account ownership), with three exceptions.  First, the institutional quality 
measure that is included in Table 8 varies depending on when an immigrant arrived in the 
U.S., as described above.  Second, these estimates include a full set of country indicator 
variables.  Finally, the immigrant indicator variable is not included in Table 8. This is 
because the country of origin indicator variables control for immigrant status.  The 
immigrant variable is equal to one when the indicator variable for the U.S. is equal to 
zero. 
 
For most of the control variables, the coefficient estimates are very close to the values 
reported in Tables 4A and 4B, suggesting that the impact of these variables on financial 
market participation is not influenced by correlation between unobserved individual 
characteristics and unobserved county of origin characteristics.  The fact that most of the 
parameter estimates do not change very much when country fixed effects are included 
also means that the variation in these variables for immigrants who share a country of 
origin has a very similar impact to variation in these variables across countries.  Or to put 
it another way, income has roughly the same effect on the financial market participation 
of Mexican immigrants as it does for all immigrants.   
 
There is one exception to the general finding that the coefficients on the control variables 
are unchanged when country fixed effects are included.  For both the savings and the 
stock market participation estimates, the coefficient on the indicator variable “non-white” 
becomes larger when country of origin controls are included.  This suggests that for a 
given country of origin, being non-white has a larger effect than it does for immigrants as 
a whole.  
 
Focusing for a moment on the stock market participation estimate in column [1] of Table 
8, we see that the quality of country of origin institutions continues to have an important 
positive effect on financial market participation in the U.S.  For a given country, 
immigrants who migrated when country of origin protection from expropriation was 
stronger are more likely to own stock in the U.S.  According to these estimates, 
immigrants who migrated from Mexico between 1990 and 1996 are 1.3 percentage points   17
more likely to own stock compared to immigrants who migrated from Mexico between 
1980 and 1984.  Improving institutional quality in the country of origin facilitates 
financial market participation in the U.S.  By the same token, declining protection from 
expropriation in migrant sending countries discourages financial market participation in 
the U.S.  Immigrants who arrived in the U.S. from China between 1990 and 1995 are 1.1 
percentage points less likely to own stock in the U.S. compared to immigrants from 
China who came to the U.S. between 1980 and 1984. 
 
For savings account ownership, we find that improvements in home country institutions 
are associated with lower savings account ownership in the U.S.  One possibility is that 
this is due to variation in the probability of return migration that is correlated with 
changing home country institutional characteristics.  The probability of return migration 
might increase when institutions improve in the country of origin.  Immigrants who are 
planning to return to their country of origin may be less willing to pay the fixed cost of 
opening an account in the U.S.  This effect may be exacerbated when improving country 
of origin institutions make it feasible for immigrants to save there, even while they are 
living in the U.S.  While this effect seems to be important for savings account ownership, 
other factors appear to dominate the decision to purchase stock in the U.S.    
 
The Effect of Age at Migration  
 
We have presented evidence that informal institutional constraints are embodied in 
individuals and that these constraints influence financial market decisions even in a new 
formal institutional framework.  However, these findings do not address the question of 
how or when these constraints become embodied in individuals.  For example, are they 
inherited and present even in individuals who migrated at a very young age?  Or are they 
only observed individuals who migrate as mature adults, consistent with the view that 
they are shaped by an individual’s experience in their country of origin?  We take an 
initial step toward answering these questions via the estimates presented in Table 9.  This 
table examines the effect of country of origin institutional quality of financial market 
participation in the U.S. for subsets of immigrants based on their age of arrival in the U.S. 
 
Table 9 divides the immigrant sample into five sub-samples based on age at arrival in the 
U.S.  For each sub-sample and dependent variable (stock ownership, Panel A and savings 
account ownership, Panel B), two estimates are produced: one which includes controls 
for the calendar year when the immigrant arrived in the U.S. and one which does not.  
Controlling for year of arrival in the U.S. produces virtually identical results, so we will 
simply discuss the findings which do not include these controls.  Our findings for stock 
market participation indicate that informal institutional constraints from the country of 
origin are not present in very young migrants.  For individuals who arrived in the U.S. 
before the age of 16, the effect of protection from expropriation is positive, but 
statistically insignificant.  However, the effect becomes positive and significant at a 
relatively young age. The likelihood of owning stock is 7.25 percentage points higher for 
an immigrant who was born in Mexico rather than in El Salvador and came to the U.S. 
when she was between 16 and 20.  The effect persists for immigrants who were 21 or 
older when they arrived in the U.S.   18
 
The findings for savings are similar although a bit less straight-forward to interpret.   
Protection from expropriation is positive and significant for immigrants who were 11 – 
15 years when they arrived in the U.S. and also for immigrants who were 21 year or older 
when they arrived in the U.S.  Overall the findings suggest an intermediate case, while 
the effect of country of origin institutions is not inherited and present even in those who 
migrated as babies, it does show up in individuals who migrated at a very young age and 
perhaps before many of them would have been likely to have had much experience with 
their country of origin institutions outside of school.  These findings are consistent with 
the view that families, and possibly schools, do much to shape an individual’s perception 
of a country’s institutional framework. 
 
The Effect of Years of U.S. Experience 
 
We have presented evidence that suggests that informal institutional constraints are 
embodied in individuals.  This begs the question of how persistent these effects are.  We 
examine this question in Table 10 which examines the effect of country of origin 
institutional quality on financial market participation in the U.S. for subsets of 
immigrants based on the number of years they have lived in the U.S. 
 
Table 10 divides the immigrant sample into seven sub-samples based on how many years 
they have been living in the U.S.  For each sub-sample and dependent variable (stock 
ownership, Panel A and savings account ownership, Panel B), two estimates are 
produced: one which includes controls for how old the immigrant was when she arrived 
in the U.S. and one which does not.  Controlling for age at arrival in the U.S. produces 
virtually identical results, so we will simply discuss the findings which do not include 
these controls.  Our findings for stock market participation suggest that the effects of 
informal institutional constraints are very persistent.  The effect of protection from 
expropriation is positive and significant for every sub-sample, except the sub-sample of 
immigrants who have been in the U.S. for more than 32 years. 
 
The results for savings account ownership are more mixed.  The effect of protection from 
expropriation risk is positive for immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for 22 or fewer 
years.  However, it is only significant for the sub-sample of immigrants who have lived in 
the U.S. for 13 to 17 years.  The contrast in the findings for stock market participation 
and savings account ownership is again consistent with the view that the institutional 
framework is likely to matter less for opening a savings account since the level of 
institutional infrastructure that is required to support a savings contract is much lower 
than what is required for a contract that involves investing in the stock market. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper adds to the growing body of theoretical and empirical work identifies the 
ability of a country’s institutions to protect private property and provide incentives for 
investment as a key explanation for the persistent disparity in financial market 
development and economic performance across countries.  We analyze the impact of   19
institutions on financial development using data on the financial decisions of immigrants 
and the native-born in the U.S. While all of the individuals whose decisions we analyze 
face the same formal institutional framework in the U.S., immigrants bring with them 
their experiences with institutions in their home countries.   
 
Our findings indicate that overall, immigrants are less likely than the native-born to 
participate in U.S. financial markets.  This finding is robust to including controls for 
income, age, education, marital status, and time spent in the U.S.  We also find that 
immigrants who come from countries with institutions that are more effective at 
protecting property rights are more likely to participate in U.S. financial markets.  In fact, 
variation in institutional quality in immigrant source countries fully explains the low 
financial market participation of immigrants relative to the native-born. Having 
controlled for institutional quality in the home country, the fact that an individual is an 
immigrant has no additional power to explain financial market participation.  This 
suggests that individuals do indeed embody informal institutional constraints. 
 
These findings are generally robust to alternative measures of institutional effectiveness 
and to various methods of controlling for unobserved individual characteristics.  We also 
show that the effects of informal institutional constraints are present even in those who 
migrated to the U.S. at a relatively young age and that these effects persist even after 
many years of experience with the institutional framework in the U.S.  Our findings are 
particularly strong for financial decisions that require a great deal of institutional support, 
notably investing in the stock market.    20
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Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Country Level Variables 
Variable Definition  and  Source 
Protection from Expropriation 
of Private Investment 
 
This variables evaluates the risk "outright confiscation and forced 
nationalization" of property.  Lower ratings "are given to countries 
where expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely event."  
Variable is the average over annual country observations 1982 – 1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data 
Quality of the Bureaucracy  
 
High scores indicate "an established mechanism for recruitment and 
training," "autonomy from political pressure," and "strength and 
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in 
government services" when governments change.  Variable is the 
average over annual country observations 1982 – 1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data 
Rule of Law  This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are 
willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement 
laws and adjudicate disputes."  Higher scores indicate:  "sound political 
institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly 
succession of power."  Lower scores indicate: "a tradition of depending 
on physical force or illegal means to settle claims."  Upon changes in 
government new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of 
the previous regime."  Variable is the average over annual country 
observations 1982 – 1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data   
Ethnic Tensions 
 
This variable “measures the degree of tension within a country 
attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Lower ratings 
are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions are high 
because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise.  
Higher ratings are given to countries where tensions are minimal, even 
though such differences may still exist.”  Variable is the average over 
annual country observations 1982 – 1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data 
Gini Coefficent  Average of Gini-coefficients across one country over all  
“high-quality” observations 1980-95. 
Source: Deininger and Squire (1996) 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm 
Log Per Capita GDP  Log of average real GNP 1970 – 1995.   
Source: “The Quality of Government” LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanez, 
Schleifer, Vishny (1999), originally from World Bank World 
Development Indicators. 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fl69/datasets.asp 
British Legal Origin   This variable is equal to one if the legal regime of the country is British 
and zero otherwise. 
Source: “The Quality of Government” LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanez, 
Schleifer, Vishny (1999). 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fl69/datasets.asp 
Years of Independence  The number of years since 1776 that the country has been independent. 
Source: CIA Factbook. 
English Speaking  This variable is equal to one if English is one of the official languages of 
the country and zero otherwise. 
Source: CIA Factbook. 
Latitude  This variable is equal to the absolute value of the latitude of the 
country’s capital divided by 90.   
Source: “The Quality of Government” LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanez, 
Schleifer, Vishny (1999). 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fl69/datasets.asp   26
Table 2: Characteristics of Immigrants and the Native Born in the SIPP Data 
 
Characteristic Whole  Sample  Native-Born  Immigrant 
Individual Characteristics     
Age 45.712  46.602    44.823 
  (16.632) (17.194) (16.004) 
%  Male  45.7% 45.6% 45.8% 
%  Married  63.5% 59.8% 67.1% 
%  non-white  22.0% 13.3% 30.7% 
% unemployed or out of the labor force  34.9%  33.4%  36.5% 
# of children < 18 in household  0.975  0.769   1.180 
  (1.274) (1.129) (1.373) 
Monthly per capita household income  1479.79  1684.07  1275.28 
  (1566.05) (1647.74) (1451.41) 
Educational Attainment (%)     
Less than High School  26.4%  17.0%  35.7% 
High  School  Graduate  27.7% 32.0% 23.4% 
Some  College  25.0% 29.3% 20.8% 
Bachelor Degree  13.6% 14.5% 12.7% 
Advanced  Degree  7.3% 7.2% 7.4% 
Year of Arrival in the U.S. (%)     
Before 1964      5.0% 
1965 – 1969      7.2% 
1970 – 1974      8.8% 
1975 – 1979      10.8% 
1980 – 1984      15.1% 
1985 – 1989      15.3% 
1990 – 1996      16.9% 
Financial Market Participation (%)     
% who own stock  13.9% 18.5%  9.3% 
% with a savings account  48.3% 54.5% 42.0% 
     
Number  of  Individuals  9,284 4,642 4,642 
Number  of  Observations  111,401 55,701 55,700 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, mean values are reported.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The unit 
of observation is a person-wave.  There are 12 waves in the panel.  Sample is restricted to individuals 18 
and over.  The native-born sample is randomly selected from the original SIPP data native-born 
(approximately 46,000 individuals) to create a sample equal in size to the immigrant sample.  All 
immigrants over 18 from the original SIPP data are included.   27
Table 3A: Summary of Country Variables 
Characteristic N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Protection  from  Expropriation  130  7.06 1.84 1.81 7.07  10.00 
Quality of the Bureaucracy   130  3.00  1.45  1.00  3.26  6.00 
Rule of Law  130  3.20  1.44  0.88  3.43  6.00 
Ethnic  Tensions  130       
Gini Coefficent  74  36.92  33.37  6.06  20.14  62.00 
Log Per Capita GDP  124  7.39  1.46  4.65  7.38  10.15 
British Legal Origin   130  0.31    0  0  1 
Years of Independence  130  88.6  72.22  0  69.11  220 
English Speaking  130  0.28    0  0  1 
Latitude 130  0.36  0.19  0  0.25  0.72 
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Table 3B: Correlation between Country Variables 
Characteristic  Prot. from 
Exp. 
Quality of 
the 
Bureau. 
Rule of 
Law 
Ethnic 
Tensions 
Gini 
Coeff.  
Log Per 
Capita 
GDP 
British 
Legal 
Origin 
Years of 
Ind. 
English 
Speaking 
Latitude 
Protection from 
Expropriation 
- - - -            
Quality  of  the  Bureaucracy      0.769***  ----          
Rule  of  Law    0.831***    0.775***  ----         
Ethnic  Tensions    0.576***    0.465***    0.635***  ----        
Gini  Coefficent  -0.635***  -0.469***  -0.640***  -0.192  ----       
Log Per Capita GDP   0.708***   0.722***   0.734***   0.540***  -0.447***  ----         
British Legal Origin    0.039   0.147*   0.010  -0.289***   0.216*  -0.013  ----       
Years of Independence   0.312***   0.227***   0.311***   0.462***   0.264**   0.192***  -0.213***  ----     
English Speaking   0.079   0.155*   0.044  -0.169*   0.145   0.041   0.770***  -0.238***  ----   
Latitude   0.581***   0.541***   0.628***   0.475***  -0.799***   0.531***  -0.287***   0.228***  -0.190***  ---- 
Notes: *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.   29
Table 4A: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial 
Market Participation, Baseline  
(Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participation) 
 
Explanatory Variable  [1]  [2] 
Age 0.002  ***  0.002    *** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Age Squared*  6.620    4.520    
 (6.240)    (6.250)     
Unemployed or Out of Labor Force  0.015  ***  0.013   *** 
  (0.004)   (0.004)  
Per Capita Income*  67.400  ***  65.800   *** 
 (2.720)    (26.600)     
Per Capita Income Squared*  -0.002  ***  -0.002   *** 
 (0.000)    (0.000)     
Married 0.068  ***  0.068    *** 
  (0.004)   (0.004)  
Male 0.005    0.005     
  (0.004)   (0.004)  
Non-white -0.041  ***  -0.033    *** 
  (0.006)   (0.006)  
High School Graduate  0.048  ***  0.045   *** 
  (0.005)   (0.005)  
Some College  0.103  ***  0.101   *** 
  (0.006)   (0.006)  
Bachelor Degree  0.164  ***  0.162   *** 
  (0.008)   (0.008)  
Advance Degree  0.217  ***  0.211   *** 
  (0.013)   (0.013)  
Number of Children  0.012  ***  0.012   *** 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Immigrant -0.046  ***  0.000     
  (0.006)   (0.010)  
Protection from Expropriation      0.021   *** 
     (0.003)   
Constant   -0.152  ***  -0.354   *** 
  (0.014)   (0.036)  
MSA Controls  Yes    Yes    
      
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.1647   0.1675  
Regression  F-test  282.17   265.92  
Number  of  Observations  103,188   103,188  
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent owned stock during the interview period in 
question and is zero otherwise.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. The reported 
coefficients and standard errors of variable marked by an asterisk (*) are the actual ones multiplied by 
1,000,000.  The omitted education category is less than high school graduate.  *** indicates significance at 
at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 4B: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial 
Market Participation, Baseline  
(Dependent Variable: Savings Account Ownership) 
 
Explanatory Variable  [1]  [2] 
Age  -0.001   -0.001  
 (0.001)    (0.001)     
Age  Squared*  37.500 ***  35.600 *** 
  (10.100)   (10.100)  
Unemployed or Out of Labor Force  -0.111  ***  -0.113  *** 
 (0.007)    (0.007)     
Per Capita Income*  60.900  ***  59.500  *** 
  (4.260)   (4.220)  
Per Capita Income Squared*  -0.002  ***  -0.002  *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  
Married  0.173 ***  0.173 *** 
 (0.007)    (0.007)     
Male  -0.037   -0.037  
 (0.007)    (0.007)     
Non-white  -0.038 ***  -0.031 *** 
 (0.009)    (0.009)     
High  School  Graduate  0.097 ***  0.095 *** 
 (0.009)    (0.009)     
Some  College  0.182 ***  0.179 *** 
 (0.010)    (0.010)     
Bachelor  Degree  0.192 ***  0.190 *** 
 (0.013)    (0.013)     
Advance  Degree  0.187 ***  0.182 *** 
 (0.015)    (0.015)     
Number  of  Children  -0.006 **  -0.006 ** 
 (0.003)    (0.003)     
Immigrant  -0.046 ***  -0.003  
 (0.008)    (0.014)     
Protection from Expropriation      0.019  *** 
     (0.005)     
Constant    0.248 ***  0.060 *** 
 (0.024)    (0.052)     
MSA  Controls  Yes   Yes  
      
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.1467   0.1479  
Regression  F-test  231.04   218.88  
Number  of  Observations  103,188   103,188  
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent owned a savings account during the interview 
period in question and is zero otherwise.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The reported coefficients and standard errors of variable marked by an asterisk (*) are the actual ones 
multiplied by 1,000,000.  The omitted education category is less than high school graduate.  *** indicates 
significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.   31
 
 
Table 5: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial Market Participation, Additional Country 
Controls  
 
A. Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participation 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Immigrant  0.000     0.005    -0.009   0.003     0.006   
  (0.010)   (0.014)   (0.011)   (0.015)   (0.012)  
Protection from 
Expropriation  0.021    *** 0.016  *** 0.022  *** 0.020    *** 0.015  *** 
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)  
English  Speaking     0.022     0.019       
     (0.014)     (0.014)    
Log  Per  Capita  GDP       -0.006   -0.005       
       (0.005)   (0.005)    
Continent  Controls           Yes   
               
MSA  Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
            
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1675   0.1661   0.1672   0.1674   0.1676   
Regression F-test  265.92   247.88   247.33   232.11   198.22   
Number of 
Observations  103,188   101,399   98,765   98,765   100,468   
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, 
education, and number of children.  Regression [1] panel [A], is the same as regression [2], Table 4.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at 
at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial Market Participation, Additional Country 
Controls, continued  
 
B. Dependent Variable: Own a Savings Account 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Immigrant  -0.003      0.031 *  0.007   0.036    *  0.018  
  (0.014)   (0.019)   (0.016)   (0.020)   (0.015)  
Protection from 
Expropriation  0.019    ***  0.017 ***  0.016 **  0.011      0.002  
  (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)  
English Speaking      0.045 **    0.048   **     
     (0.019)     (0.019)     
Log Per Capita GDP          0.008    0.010        
        (0.008)   (0.008)     
Continent  Controls            Yes   
               
MSA  Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   
                
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.1479   0.1504   0.1503   0.1508   0.1525  
Regression  F-test  218.88   211.91   210.37   197.99   164.81  
Number of 
Observations  103,188   101,399   98,765   98,765   100,468  
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, 
education, and number of children.  Regression [1] panel [A], is the same as regression [2], Table 4.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at 
at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 6A: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial 
Market Participation, Alternative Measures of Institution Quality 
(Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participation)  
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Immigrant  0.000    0.010 -0.0003  -0.064*** -0.024*  -0.046***    -0.047*** 
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) 
Protection from 
Expropriation 0.021***   
      
  (0.003)        
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
 
0.022*** 
     
    (0.004)       
Rule of Law      0.020***         
     (0.004)      
Ethnic  Tensions      0.004     
      (0.003)     
British Legal 
Origin 
    
0.035*** 
  
       (0.014)    
Latitude        0.082***     
        (0.029)   
Years of 
Independence 
      
0.0001 
         (0.0001) 
MSA  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Ad.  R-Squared  0.1675 0.1674 0.1668 0.1648 0.1645 0.1645 0.1639 
Regression  F-test 265.92 265.46 265.43 262.15 263.70 264.14 262.19 
Number  of  Obs.  103,188 103,188 103,188 103,188 101,267 101,267 101,399 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, and number of children.  Regression [1] 
panel [A], is the same as regression [2], Table 4. A linear probability model is used and standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 6B: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial 
Market Participation, Alternative Measures of Institution Quality 
(Dependent Variable: Savings Account Ownership)  
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Immigrant  -0.003    0.005 0.009  -0.065*** 0.007  -0.043***    -0.026** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) 
Protection from 
Expropriation  0.019*** 
      
  (0.005)        
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
 
0.020*** 
     
    (0.005)       
Rule of Law      0.024***         
     (0.005)      
Ethnic  Tensions      0.004     
      (0.005)     
British Legal 
Origin 
    
0.067*** 
  
       (0.018)    
Latitude        0.062     
        (0.043)   
Years of 
Independence 
      
0.0002** 
         (0.0002) 
MSA  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Adj.  R-Squared  0.1479 0.1478 0.1482 0.1467 0.1496 0.1488 0.1490 
Regression  F-test 218.88 217.05 219.03 214.82 222.85 221.08 221.65 
Number  of  Obs.  103,188 103,188 103,188 103,188 101,267 101,267 101,399 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, and number of children.  Regression [1] 
panel [B], is the same as regression [1], Table 5 panel [B]. A linear probability model is used and standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 
10% level. 
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Table 7: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial 
Market Participation, Controlling for Home Country Inequality  
 
A. Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participation 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] 
Immigrant  0.010   -0.007   -0.017     
  (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.013)  
Protection from 
Expropriation  0.025 ***  0.017 ***  0.020    *** 
  (0.004)   (0.005)    (0.006)  
Gini Coefficient      -0.002  ***  -0.002   *** 
     (0.001)   (0.001)  
Log Per Capita GDP          -0.009    
       (0.007)  
MSA  Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes  
        
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.1654    0.1654   0.1641  
Regression  F-test  264.49    264.49   235.36  
Number  of  Observations  89632    89632   87843  
 
B. Dependent Variable: Savings Account Ownership 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] 
Immigrant  -0.002   0.004   -0.023     
  (0.016)   (0.061)   (0.019)   
Protection from 
Expropriation  0.015 **  -0.005   -0.008     
  (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.010)   
Gini Coefficient      -0.005  ***  -0.005   *** 
     (0.001)   (0.001)  
Log Per Capita GDP          0.012    
       (0.010)  
MSA  Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   
        
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.1506    0.1518   0.1547  
Regression  F-test  214.04    200.81   197.26  
Number  of  Observations  89,632    89,632   87,843  
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, and number of children.  A linear 
probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** 
at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 8: The Effect of Immigrant Status and Institution Quality on Financial 
Market Participation, Controlling for Correlation between Unobserved Individual 
Attributes and Country of Origin 
 
 Stock  Market 
Participation 
Savings Account 
Ownership 
Explanatory Variable  [1]  [2] 
Age  0.002 ***  -0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Age  Squared*  2.480   32.900 *** 
  (6.290)   (9.940)  
Unemployed or Out of Labor Force  0.014  ***  -0.108  *** 
  (0.004)   (0.007)  
Per Capita Income*  65.000  ***  55.100  *** 
  (2.630)   (4.110)  
Per Capita Income Squared*  -0.002  ***  -0.002  *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  
Married  0.068 ***  0.173 *** 
  (0.004)   (0.007)  
Male  0.006   -0.037 *** 
  (0.004)   (0.006)  
Non-white  -0.051 ***  -0.079 *** 
  (0.006)   (0.010)  
High  School  Graduate  0.046 ***  0.083 *** 
  (0.005)   (0.010)  
Some  College  0.102 ***  0.164 *** 
  (0.006)   (0.010)  
Bachelor  Degree  0.163 ***  0.183 *** 
  (0.009)   (0.013)  
Advance  Degree  0.210 ***  0.185 *** 
  (0.012)   (0.015)  
Number  of  Children  0.012 ***  -0.005  
  (0.002)   (0.003)  
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.006 **  -0.015 *** 
  (0.003)   (0.005)  
Constant    -0.215 ***  0.424 *** 
 (0.034)    (0.057)   
Country Controls  Yes    Yes   
       
MSA Controls  Yes    Yes   
      
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1742    0.1574   
Regression F-test   86.37     76.98   
Number of Observations  104,164    104,164   
Notes:  Dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent had a savings account or owned stock during 
the interview period in question and is zero otherwise.  A linear probability model is used and standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The reported coefficients and standard errors of variable marked by an asterisk (*) are the 
actual ones multiplied by 1,000,000.  The omitted education category is less than high school graduate.  
*** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 9: The Effect Institution Quality on Financial Market Participation, 
Controlling for Age at Migration  
MIGRANTS ONLY 
 
A. Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participation 
Explanatory Variables  Age at Arrival in U.S. 
  1 – 5  6 – 10  11 – 15  16 – 20  21+ 
No Year of Arrival Controls       
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.025 0.013 0.006  0.029***  0.026*** 
  (0.018) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2200 0.2189 0.3233 0.2761 0.2410 
Regression  F-test  2.15 2.37 4.36 3.61  23.65 
Year of Arrival Controls       
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.024 0.013 0.004  0.029***    0.026*** 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2193 0.2252 0.3272 0.2788 0.2459 
Regression  F-test  1.89 2.11 3.46 2.77  17.14 
Number  of  Observations  2,037 1,840 2,639 5,600  25,979 
 
B. Dependent Variable: Savings Account Ownership 
Explanatory Variable  Age at Arrival in U.S. 
  1 – 5  6 – 10  11 – 15  16 – 20  21+ 
No Year of Arrival Controls       
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.035 0.022  0.037* 0.010    0.019*** 
  (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.006) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2936 0.3352 0.2924 0.2338 0.1726 
Regression  F-test  6.52 13.77 11.99 13.61 32.76 
Year of Arrival Controls       
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.037 0.020  0.037* 0.012    0.017*** 
  (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.006) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2999 0.3395 0.2967 0.2404 0.1834 
Regression  F-test  5.42 11.24  9.29 11.70 26.86 
Number  of  Observations  2,037 1,840 2,639 5,600  25,979 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, and number of children.   A linear 
probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at 
at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
   38
Table 10: The Effect Institution Quality on Financial Market Participation, 
Controlling for Years in the U.S.  
MIGRANTS ONLY 
 
A. Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participation 
Explanatory Variables  Years in the U.S. 
  1 – 7  8 – 12  13 – 17  18 – 22  23 – 27  28 - 32  33+ 
No Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection from Expropriation 
0.020
*** 0.019
*** 0.029
*** 0.041
*** 
 
0.021
*  
 
0.043
***   0.023 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2829 0.3080 0.3174 0.3282 0.2955 0.2956 0.3276 
Regression  F-test  5.40 4.46 8.88 4.14 4.47 4.85 4.28 
Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection from Expropriation 
0.020
*** 0.019
*** 0.029
*** 0.041
*** 
 
0.020
*  
 
0.044
*** 0.022 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2827 0.3082 0.3179 0.3351 0.2986 0.2975 0.3477 
Regression  F-test  4.79 3.68 7.02 3.42 3.66 4.04 4.22 
N  8,350 7,364 7,275 4,939 4,197 3,545 2,425 
 
B.  Dependent Variable: Savings Account Ownership 
Explanatory Variables  Years in the U.S. 
  1 – 7  8 – 12  13 – 17  18 – 22  23 – 27  28 - 32  33+ 
No Age at Arrival Controls         
Protection from Expropriation  0.014  0.019  0.028**  0.018  -0.004   0.006   -0.009 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2752 0.2560 0.2080 0.2382 0.2311 0.2593 0.2381 
Regression  F-test  13.65  15.14  13.48 7.34 5.74 5.71 3.36 
Age at Arrival Controls         
Protection from Expropriation  0.014  0.018  0.028**  0.016  -0.002   0.007   -0.006 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2764 0.2571 0.2097 0.2456 0.2337 0.2602 0.2613 
Regression  F-test  12.75  12.69  11.11 6.64 5.14 4.47 3.25 
N  8,350 7,364 7,275 4,939 4,197 3,545 2,425 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, and number of children.   A linear 
probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at 
at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
 
 